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Worldwide, car traffic has increased rapidly during the last decades. Between 1950 
and 1990, the amount of motorised traffic cars has increased from 75 million to 675 
million. This implies that during this period, motorised traffic has multiplied 9 times. 
80% motorised traffic involves private transportation (OECD, 1996). It is likely that 
the number of kilometres driven per person as well as car ownership will increase 
further in the future (OECD, 1996).  
Increased  traffic  and  transport  results  in  many  positive  effects.  For  example, 
traffic and transport facilitates economic activities. Furthermore, it facilitates activities 
of citizens. Motorised transport provides individuals the opportunity to be flexible, 
and visit activities at many different places. However, mobility also results in negative 
effects. First, increasing car use threatens the accessibility of locations. Congestion is 
especially a problem in densely populated areas. Second, it threatens environmental 
qualities, e.g., due to emission of CO2 and particles. Third, increasing car use may 
result in a reduction of quality of life, especially in cities, due to e.g., traffic safety, 
sound pollution, local air pollution, and parking problems. 
Various policy measures may be implemented to reduce the problems caused by 
car use. Some do not necessitate a reduction in car use (e.g., increased capacity of 
road infrastructure, improved car technology, or limiting speed); they typically reduce 
the environmental impact per car. Other measures are aimed at changing car use with 
respect  to  when  and  where  people  drive,  particularly  on  major  commuter  arteries 
during peak hours and in city centres. Since the proposed measures focus on changing 
or  reducing  demand  for  car  use,  they  are  generally  referred  to  as  travel  demand 
management (TDM) measures (Kitamura, Fujii, & Pas, 1997).  
A  large  number  of  TDM  measures  have  been  proposed  and  (sometimes) 
implemented  with  the  aim  of  reducing  car  use.  In  general,  four  types  of  TDM 
measures may be distinguished (Steg, 2003). First, provision of physical alternatives 
and physical changes. Examples are improving public transport and constructing new 
road infrastructure. Second, legal policies, for instance, prohibition of car use in city 
centres. Third, economic policies such as kilometre charges and congestion pricing. 
Fourth, information and education strategies, for instance, information campaigns or 
social marketing. 3 
Many  people  belief  that  especially  economic  strategies  may  be  effective  in 
reducing problems of car use. However, public support for transport pricing measures 
is  generally  low  (e.g.,  Steg,  2003;  Schade  &  Schlag,  2000).  Public  support  is  an 
important precondition for implementing policies that restrict individual car use, such 
as transport pricing (Schlag & Teubel, 1997; Steg, 2003). 
In this paper, we discuss two types of factors that may affect the acceptability of 
pricing policies aimed to change transport behaviour. First, acceptability may depend 
on  characteristics  of  pricing  policies,  i.e.,  the  way  policies  are  designed.  Several 
policy  characteristics  may  be  relevant,  such  as  price  level,  the  extent  of 
differentiation, and how and when people have to pay. In this paper we focus on a 
characteristic that appears to strongly affect the acceptability of pricing policies: the 
allocation  of  revenues  (Verhoef,  1996;  Jones,  2003).  Second,  the  perceived 
effectiveness of pricing policies may affect the extent to which they are acceptable. If 
people expect policies to actually solve problems of car use, for instance less traffic 
jams, they may evaluate pricing policies as more acceptable than if they expect the 
measures not to be effective. If people believe measures to be ineffective, they will be 
confronted with negative effects of the measure (e.g., higher transport prices), while at 
the same time collective problems are not being solved. At the same time, transport 
pricing measures  that seriously  affect  people’s freedom to move  will  not  be  very 
acceptable  (e.g.,  Jakobsson,  Fujii,  &  Gärling,  2000).  The  relationships  between 
perceived  effectiveness  and  acceptability  of  transport  pricing  will  be  elaborated 
below. 
 
Relationship between revenue use and acceptability of transport pricing 
In general, studies on relationships between revenue use and acceptability of pricing 
policies examined public attitudes towards several types of revenue use. These studies 
revealed that policies are generally more acceptable if revenues are used in a way that 
benefits users personally (Harrington, Krupnick, & Alberini, 2001; Verhoef, 1996; 
Jones, 1991; Schade & Schlag, 2000; CfIT, 2000). Pricing policies appear to be most 
acceptable if revenues are invested in the transport system, e.g., by reducing taxes 
related to car ownership and car use (Harrington et al., 2001; Verhoef, 1996; Schade 
& Schlag, 2000; CfIT, 2000) or by improving public transport (CfIT, 2000; Schade & 
Schlag,  2000).  If  revenues  are  allocated  outside  the  transport  domain,  such  as 
allocating revenues to general public funds, transport pricing policies are evaluated as 4 
rather unacceptable (Schade & Schlag, 2000; Verhoef, 1996). Similar results were 
found in a study on the acceptability of pricing policies to reduce energy use, which 
revealed that  policies are evaluated as more acceptable  if revenues meet people’s 
interests directly, rather than allocating revenues to general public funds. In fact, price 
increases of  products using a  lot  of energy  were evaluated as  acceptable as  price 
decreases of products using little energy, provided that revenues were spent in a way 
that would further simulate energy savings (Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2006).  
Thus, in general people evaluate pricing policies as more acceptable if individuals 
themselves rather than the general public benefit from the way revenues are allocated. 
Revenues of transport pricing policies may be returned to car users either by reducing 
car  related  taxes  or  improving  road  infrastructure.  Allocating  revenues  to  general 
public funds typically involves reducing general taxes that are not related to car use.  
If revenues are ‘returned to the payer’, policies are probably perceived to be more 
fair, and less restrictive because car users actually see they get something in return (cf. 
Jakobsson et al., 2000). Most people will probably perceive allocating revenues of 
transport pricing to reduce general taxes as a loss, because the link between paying for 
car use and receiving this money back via other taxes is rather indirect. If revenues of 
transport pricing policies are returned to car users, e.g., by reducing car related taxes, 
the link between paying and receiving something in return is probably more clear to 
people. Consequently, people may perceive that they will loose less than if revenues 
are allocated to general public funds. Based on this, it is hypothesized that transport 
pricing policies are more acceptable if revenues are returned to the car user rather than 
to the general public.  
 
Relationship between perceived effectiveness of pricing policies and acceptability 
It  is  rather  difficult  to  predict  actual  effects  of  pricing  policies.  Despite  these 
difficulties, most people have opinions and expectancies about the effects of transport 
pricing policies. In general, people do not expect pricing policies to be very effective 
in changing their own car use (e.g., Jakobsson et al., 2000; Schlag & Teubel, 1997; 
Steg, 1996), congestion, and environmental problems (Rienstra, Rietveld, & Verhoef, 
1999). People do expect pricing policies to be more effective in changing car use of 
others in comparison to their own car use, but they expect the effect on others car use 
still to be low (Steg, 1996). 5 
Research has shown that acceptability of transport pricing policies is related to the 
perceived effectiveness of these measures in reducing problems caused by car use 
(e.g., Rienstra et al., 1999; Bartley, 1995; Schade & Schlag, 2003). These studies 
revealed  that  the  more  people  expect  a  pricing  policy  to  be  effective  in  solving 
problems  (i.e.,  congestion),  the  more  acceptable  they  are.  Actual  effectiveness  of 
transport  pricing  appeared  to  be  related  to  acceptability  judgements  as  well.  For 
example the acceptability of a toll ring around Oslo increased after the measure was 
implemented (Tretvik, 2003; Odeck & Bråthen, 2002). However, acceptability did not 
increase after the implementation of a toll ring in Stuttgart (Schlag & Teubel, 1997). 
An explanation may be the fact that people in Oslo experienced advantages of the toll 
ring: congestion decreased. In Stuttgart, congestion levels were not reduced after the 
implementation  of  the  toll  ring.  Thus,  it  may  be  expected  that  transport  pricing 
policies are more acceptable if people think they are effective in reducing transport 
problems. 
On the other hand, pricing policies may be more acceptable if they are not too 
effective in reducing one’s own car use, because people do not want to be restricted in 
their  freedom  to  move.  Pricing  policies  that  are  effective  in  reducing  transport 
problems, such as congestion and environmental problems, are also likely to affect 
one’s own car use.  
In  this  paper,  we  examine  whether  the  perceived  effects  of  transport  pricing 
measures on collective problems and on one’s own situation affects the acceptability 
of these measures. In addition, it is examined if the perceived effects of one’s own 
situation moderate the relationship between the perceived effects of pricing policies 
and  the  acceptability.  That  is,  perceived  effects  of  transport  pricing  measures  on 
collective problems may be related to acceptability only when the transport pricing 
measure  does  not  seriously  affect  one’s  own  situation.  This  implies  that  the 
relationship between perceived effects on collective problems and acceptability may 







512  Dutch  car  users  completed  a  computerized  questionnaire  via  the  Internet. 
Respondents were selected from a telepanel of a Dutch marketing research institute 
called  TNS  NIPO  (Dutch  Institute  for  Public  Opinion  and  Market  Research). 
Respondents filled out the questionnaire at their computer at home. 
The sample consisted of 263 respondents who regularly experienced congestion. 
These respondents were (on average) spending at least twice a week 10 minutes or 
more in a traffic jam when travelling in the morning to work by car. This group is 
labelled ‘congestion drivers’. The other 249 car owners were randomly selected from 
the total panel, which is a representative sample of the Dutch population. This group 
is labelled ‘car users’. The mean age of the full sample was 42 years (SD = 13.2), 
61%  was  male,  and  39%  was  female.  45%  of  the  respondents  finished  lower 
education,  29% finished middle education, and 8% finished  higher education. For 
18% the finished education level was unknown. The average gross income per year 
was  classified  into  4  classes:  less  than  €28.500  a  year  (19%  of  the  respondents), 
between €28.500 and €45.000 (30%), between €45.000 and €68.000 (27%), and more 
than  €68.000 (15%).  For  9% of the respondents  data on income level is  missing. 
Almost 22% of the respondents were single, 2% was single with children, 31% had a 
partner but no children and 45% had a partner and children. 
The sample of car users was representative for the Dutch population (Centraal 
Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), 2005), although the average age in this sample is a 
bit higher. In this sample, average age was 45 years whereas the average age of the 
Dutch population is 39 years. This is due to the fact that the sample consisted of car 
users, i.e., minimum age is 18. The sample of congestion drives comprised more male 
respondents, with a higher income and education level (see also Table 1). This is 
comparable with other samples of car users who are often confronted with traffic jams 
(Bureau Goudappel Coffeng, 1997; Steg, 2005).  
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Table 1.   Sex, age, income, education level and household type for the total sample and for both sub-
samples: car users and congestion drivers 
    Car users  
(N= 249) 
Congestion drivers 
(N = 263) 
Total  
(N = 512) 
male  49%  72.5  61%  Sex 
female  51%  27.5  39% 
Age (M)    45  39   42 
Income  < 28,000  22%  16%  19% 
  28,500 – 45,000  28%  31%  30% 
  45,000 - 68,000  20%  34%  27% 
  > 68,000  10%  19%  15% 
  unknown  19%  -  9% 
Education level  lower  57%  34%  45% 
  middle  22%  36%  29% 
  higher  5%  11%  8% 
  unknown  16%  20%  18% 
Household type  single  18%  26%  22% 
  single + children  1%  3%  2% 
  partner, no children  33%  30%  31% 




Data presented in this paper was part of a larger questionnaire study aimed to examine 
the effectiveness and acceptability of transport pricing policies. We focus on parts of 
the questionnaire that are relevant for the presented paper. Respondents judged two 
types of kilometre charges: a flat and a variable kilometre charge. For both kilometre 
charges,  various  versions  were  constructed,  which  systematically  varied  on  two 
relevant  policy  characteristics:  revenue  use  and  price  level.  In  other  words,  we 
followed a 2 (type of kilometre charge) by 2 (revenue use) by 3 (price level) design 
(see also Table 2). Each respondent judged both policies, therefore policy type was a 
within subject factor. Revenue use and price level were systematically varied between 
respondents, therefore these were between subject factors. Below, we will describe 
both kilometre charges in more detail. 
 
Measure 1 – flat kilometre charge 
A kilometre charge was described, in which every car user had to pay for each 
kilometre driven by car (see Table 2). Price level was systematically varied. For 
each kilometre driven by car either 3, 6, or 12 eurocents had to be paid. The way 
revenues were used was also varied systematically: revenues were either used to 
decrease income taxes or returned to the car user by abolishing road taxes (if price 
level was 3 cent), by abolishing road taxes as well as taxes on the purchase of cars 
(if price level was 6 cent), or by abolishing both these taxes and improving existing 8 
and build new infrastructure (if price level was 12 cent). In case revenues were 
returned to car users, revenue use type was chosen in such a way that the policy 
would be budget-neutral for an average Dutch household. The amount of money that 
respondents  would  receive  back  by  abolishing  road  taxes  and/  or  taxes  on  the 
purchase  of  cars  was  estimated  on  basis  of  fuel  type  and  weight  of  the  car the 
respondent usually drove (see also Appendix). Based on their individual car use, i.e., 
yearly kilometrage of the respondent personally, financial consequences for each 
respondent  were  estimated.  Both  costs  of  the  kilometre  charge  and  profits  from 
revenue use, in case revenues were used to decrease car related taxes, were show, as 
well as total changes in travel cost if the kilometre charge was implemented. Total 
costs  for  respondents  could  increase  or  decrease,  dependent  on  the  number  of 
kilometres they actually drove and revenue use.  
 
Measure 2 – variable kilometre charge 
Second, a time-dependent kilometre charge was judged (see Table 2). During rush 
hours (7.00 – 9.00 a.m. and 5.00- 7.00 p.m.), people had to pay a higher fee than on 
non-rush hours. Again, price level and revenue use were varied systematically. Price 
levels were either low, people had to pay 6 cent per kilometre during rush hours and 
2  cents  per  kilometre  during  remaining  hours.  Average  price  levels  meant  that 
people had to pay 12 cent per kilometre during rush hours and 4 cents per kilometre 
outside rush hours. High fees implied that people had to pay 24 cents per kilometre 
during rush hours and 8 cents per kilometre during non-rush hours. Identical to the 
first measure, revenues were used to decrease income tax or returned to the car user, 
via abolishing road taxes (lowest price level), abolishing road taxes as well as taxes 
on purchasing cars (middle price level), or abolishing both these taxes as well as 
improving  and  building  road  infrastructure  (highest  price  level).  Again,  the 
kilometre charge was budget neutral for an average Dutch household. As with the 
first measure, total costs for respondents were estimated and shown, based on their 
current travel behaviour.  
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Table 2.   Two kilometre charges that were evaluated by respondents 
    Flat kilometre charge  Variable kilometre charge 
      rush hours 









decrease income tax 
 








Decrease income tax 
 





decrease income tax 
 
abolish road taxes and tax 








decrease income tax 
 
Abolish road taxes and 




























decrease income tax 
 
abolish road taxes, tax on 
purchase of cars, and 








decrease income tax 
 
Abolish road taxes, tax 
on purchase of cars, and 




In  this  paper  we  will  focus  only  on  the  effect  of  revenue  use,  i.e.,  spending  the 
revenue use on decreasing income taxes versus returning them to car users, on the 
acceptability of the measures 
 
Judgments of the measures 
Each  respondent  rated  one  version  of  the  kilometre  charges.  The  versions  were 
randomly  allocated  to  respondents.  The  financial  consequences  of  the  kilometre 
charges for respondents were estimated, based on their current travel behaviour and 
type.  The  actual  changes  in  travel  costs  were  indicated  as  “you  profit”  a  certain 
amount (if tax decreases are larger than kilometre charge), or as a loss “you loose” a 
certain amount (if tax decreases are smaller than kilometre charge).  
For each measure, respondents indicated whether they thought the measures would 
be effective on a seven-point scale (1 -very unlikely- to 7 -very likely-). First, they 
indicated the perceived effects on congestion levels: “how likely is it that congestion 
levels decrease if this measure is implemented?” (Mflat km charge = 2.2; Mvariable km charge = 
2.7). Second, they rated the effects on environmental quality: “how likely is it that 
environmental problems will decrease if this measure is implemented?” (Mflat km charge 
= 2.3; Mvariable km charge = 2.4). It appeared that for both kilometre charges, the perceived 
effects  on  congestion  and  environmental  problems  were  strongly  correlated  (flat 
kilometre charge: α = .87; variable kilometre charge: α = .89). Therefore, for each 
kilometre charge, mean scores on both questions were computed. The mean score on 10 
‘perceived effects on collective problems’ could range from 1 –very unlikely- to 7 -
very  likely-  that  collective  problems  will  decrease  if  the  kilometre  charge  is 
implemented. Third, respondents indicated how the measure would affect their own 
situation: “if you consider all pros and cons of the measure, would you be better or 
worse  off  if  this  measure  is  implemented?”  This  question  was  included  after  the 
questions on effects on collective problems, to ensure that respondents would weight 
individual and collective costs and benefits. Responses were given on a seven-point 
scale (1 -much worse off- to 7 -much better off-; (Mflat km charge = 2.6; Mvariable km charge = 
2.6).  
Finally,  respondents  indicated  how  acceptable  the  measure  was  to  them  “how 
acceptable  do  you  think  this  measure  is?”  on  a  seven-point  scale  (1  -very 






Relationship between revenue use and acceptability 
An ANOVA revealed that respondents evaluated the flat kilometre charge as more 
acceptable if revenues are returned to car users rather than if the revenues are returned 
to the general  public by decreasing income  taxes  (F (1,510) =  22.7,  p< .001). In 
contrast to our expectations, the acceptability of the variable kilometre charge was not 
related to revenue use (F (1,510) = 1.8, p= n.s.). When controlling for actual changes 
in travel costs, similar results were found: revenue use does affect the acceptability of 
the flat kilometre charge (F (1,509) = 12.4, p< .001), but not the acceptability of the 
variable kilometre charge (F (1,509) = 1.1, p= n.s). 
 
Relationship between perceived effectiveness and acceptability 
To examine relationships between perceived effectiveness and the acceptability of the 
kilometre  charges,  correlations  coefficients  were  calculated  (see  Table  3).  The 
correlation matrix reveals that for both measures, acceptability was positively related 
to perceived effects on collective problems, own situation, and changes in travel costs 
as assessed by the researchers. Respondents evaluated the kilometre charges as more 
acceptable if they thought they are effective in reducing collective problems. These 
results are in line with previous studies: measures are more acceptable if people think 11 
these measures help reducing problems resulting from car use. Furthermore, in line 
with our expectations, people thought the kilometre charges were more acceptable if 
they thought the measures would not have negative effects for them personally. This 
also emerges from the positive correlation between acceptability and actual changes in 
travel costs resulting from the kilometre charges: the measures are more acceptable if 
travel costs would decrease. 
The  positive  correlation  between  perceived  effects  on  collective  problems  and 
perceived effect on one’s situation in general indicate that, in general, respondents 
assume that their situation will improve if collective problems reduce. 
Finally,  actual  changes  in  travel  costs  did  not  correlate  significantly  with 
perceived effects on collective problems, but did correlate with the perceived effect of 
the kilometre charges on one’s own situation as well as with the acceptability of the 
measures. This implies that people expect to be better off and evaluate the measure as 
more  acceptable  if  their  travel  costs  decrease  rather  than  increase.  Interestingly, 
acceptability appears to correlate less strongly with actual changes in travel costs than 
with  perceived effects  of  the measures  on  collective  problems.  This  suggests  that 
acceptability of the kilometre charges may depend more strongly on the perceived 
effects  of  the  measures  on  collective  problems  than  on  personal  financial 
consequences of the measure. The weak correlation between actual changes in travel 
costs and perceived effects of the measures on one’s own situation is interesting in the 
light of the strong correlation between expected effects on one’s general situation and 
acceptability of the kilometre charges. This may indicate that changes in collective 




Table 3.  Correlations between acceptability and perceived effects of kilometre charges on collective 
problems, own situation, and actual travel costs 
  Acceptability  Collective problems  Own situation 
Collective problems  .31** 
.43** 
   












Note 1:  The upper correlation refers to the flat kilometre charge; the lower correlation refers to the 
variable kilometre charge 
Note 2:  ** p< .001 12 
We  examined  to  what  extent  both  perceived  effects  of  the  kilometre  charges  on 
collective problems and on one’s own situation are related to acceptability judgements 
via  regression  analyses.  Further,  it  was  examined  if  the  relationship  between 
perceived effects of kilometre charges on collective problems and acceptability was 
moderated by the perceived effects of the measure on one’s own situation.  
A regression analyses revealed a main effect of the perceived effects on collective 
problems and one’s own situation. Together they explained 54% of the variance of 
acceptability of the flat kilometre charge (F (4, 508) = 201.6, p< .001). Both main 
effects  are  independent,  which  implies  that  the  perceived  effects  on  collective 
problems  as  well  as  the  perceived  effects  on  one’s  own  situation  determine  the 
acceptability of the flat kilometre charge. The perceived effectiveness of one’s own 
situation  did  not moderate the relationship between the perceived effectiveness of 
collective problems and acceptability of the flat kilometre charge. 
Similar  results  were  found  for  the  variable  kilometre  charge:  acceptability  was 
determined  by  the  perceived  effects  on  collective  problems  and  on  one’s  own 
situation (F (4, 508) = 194.7, p< .001). Both factors explained in total 54% variance of 




4. Conclusion and discussion 
 
In this study, we examined the effect of revenue use and perceived effectiveness of 
transport pricing on acceptability of transport pricing policies. In line with previous 
studies, the pricing policies were evaluated as rather unacceptable (e.g., Steg, 2003; 
Schade & Schlag, 2000). It was hypothesized that transport pricing policies are less 
acceptable if they are perceived to be unfair and if they restrict people’s freedom to 
move. Therefore, it was expected that pricing policies are more acceptable if revenues 
are used to decrease car related taxes rather than general taxes. As expected, the flat 
kilometre charge was evaluated as more acceptable if revenues were returned to the 
car  users  rather  than  to  the  general  public.  For  the  variable  kilometre  charge,  no 
difference was found in the acceptability of the measure if revenues were returned to 
the  car  user  rather  than  to  the  general  public.  Also,  acceptability  of  the  variable 
kilometre charge appeared not to be dependent on revenue use when controlled for 
actual changes in travel costs.  13 
Economic theory proposes to distribute revenues in a way that brings maximum 
benefits or highest welfare to society in general. From that perspective, decreasing 
general taxes excels reducing car related taxes, since the former will result in a neutral 
net financial effect for all people (Ubbels & Verhoef, 2002; Verhoef et al., 2004), i.e., 
high  as  well  as  low  income  groups  will  generally  profit  if  revenues  are  used  to 
decrease income taxes (Verhoef & Rietveld, 2001). Using revenues to decrease fixed 
taxes for car users, i.e., road taxes or taxes on the purchase of cars, will result in a 
positive effect on most people, but results in negative welfare effects for low incomes. 
The  results  of this study show that  car  users have  different  preferences for using 
revenues. Car users find investing revenues of pricing policies to decrease income 
taxes less acceptable than using revenues to decrease car related taxes.  
In  line  with  former  studies,  in  general,  people  expect  little  or  no  effects  of 
kilometre charges on collective problems resulting from car use as well as on their 
own  situation.  The  acceptability  of  both  the  flat  and  variable  kilometre  charges 
appeared to be related to relationship between perceived effects of these measures on 
collective  problems  as  well  as  to  perceived  effects  on  one’s  own  situation.  This 
implies  that  people  evaluate  transport  pricing  measures  as  more  acceptable  if  the 
measures  actually  reduce  collective  problems  resulting  from  car  use  and  if  the 
measures do not seriously affect their own behaviour. And the other way around: the 
kilometre charges are less acceptable if they are not effective in reducing collective 
problems and if they do affect one’s own behaviour. Thus, transport policies are more 
acceptable  if  they  actually  reduce  the  problems  caused  by  car  use,  without 
significantly affecting one’s own behaviour. 
The relationship between perceived effects of the kilometre charges on collective 
problems and acceptability of the measures was not moderated by the perceived effect 
of the measures on one’s own situation. This implies that the relationship between 
effects on collective problems and acceptability is not dependent on the effects one’s 
own behaviour, i.e., we did not find any evidence that a relationship between effects 
on  collective  problems  and  acceptability  can  only  be  found  if  a  transport  pricing 
measure does not seriously affect one’s own behaviour. 
Interestingly, the perceived effects of the kilometre charges relates more strongly 
to the expected effects of the kilometre charge on collective problems than on actual 
changes in individual travel costs. This indicates that the overall effects of transport 
pricing  policies for  oneself are  not  only  (and mainly)  dependent  on  the  extent  to 14 
which individual travel costs reduce or increase. Apparently, other factors, such as 
perceived effects  on collective problems, are more  important in this respect.  This 
suggests that people may be better off if collective problems, such as congestion and 
environmental problems, reduce. The results of this study indicate that acceptability of 
transport  pricing  strategies  is  more  strongly  related  to  the  extent  to  which  these 







Bartley, B. (1995). Mobility impacts, reactions and opinions. Traffic engineering and control, 36, 596-
603. 
Bureau Goudappel Coffeng (1997). Marktprofiel van een filerijder. Eindrapport Deventer: Bureau 
Goudappel Coffeng. 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) (2005). Bevolking: kerncijfers. Available on: 
http://www.statline.nl. 
Commission for Integrated Transport (CfIT) (2000). Public attitudes to transport in England. 
Harrington, W., Krupnick, A. J., & Alberini, A. (2001). Overcoming public aversion to congestion 
pricing. Transportation Research Part A, 35, 87-105. 
Jakobsson, C., Fujii, S., & Gärling, T. (2000). Determinants of private car users' acceptance of road 
pricing. Transport Policy, 7, 153-158. 
Jones, P. (2003). Acceptability of transport pricing strategies: Meeting the challenge. In J. Schade & B. 
Schlag (Eds.). Acceptability of transport pricing strategies (pp. 27-62). Oxford: Elsevier Science. 
Jones, P. M. (1991). Gaining public support for road pricing through a package approach. Traffic 
engineering and control, 32, 194-196. 
Kitamura, R., Fujii, S., & Pas, E. I. (1997). Time-use data, analysis and modelling: toward the next 
generation of transportation planning methodologies. Transport Policy, 4, 225 – 235. 
Odeck, J. & Bråthen, S. (2002). Toll financing in Norway: the success, failures and perspective for the 
future. Transport Policy, 9, 253-260. 
Rienstra, S. A., Rietveld, P., & Verhoef, E. T. (1999). The social support for policy measures in 
passenger transport. A statistical analysis for the Netherlands. Transportation Research D, 4, 181-
200. 
Schade, J. & Schlag, B. (2000). Acceptability of urban transport pricing. Helsinki: VATT. 
Schade, J. & Schlag, B. (2003). Acceptability of urban transport pricing strategies. Transportation 
Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, 6, 45-61. 
Schlag, B. & Teubel, U. (1997). Public acceptability of transport pricing. IATSS Research, 21, 134-142. 15 
Steg, E. M. (1996). Gedragsverandering ter vermindering van het autogebruik: theoretische analyse en 
empirische studie over probleembesef, verminderingsbereidheid en beoordeling van 
beleidsmaatregelen. Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen: Faculteit der Psychologische, 
Sociologische en Pedagogische Wetenschappen (dissertation). 
Steg, E. M., Dreijerink, L., & Abrahamse, W. (2006). Why are energy policies acceptable and 
effective? Environment and Behavior (in press). 
Steg, L. (2003). Factors influencing the acceptability and effectiveness of transport pricing. In J. 
Schade & B. Schlag (Eds.). Acceptability of transport pricing strategies 27 ed., (pp. 187-202). 
Oxford: Elsevier Science. 
Steg, L. (2005). Car use: Lust and must. Instrumental, symbolic and affective motives for car use. 
Transportation Research-A, 39, 147-162. 
Tretvik, T. (2003). Urban road pricing in Norway: Public acceptability and travel behaviour. In J. 
Schade & B. Schlag (Eds.). Acceptability of transport pricing strategies Oxford: Elsevier Science. 
Ubbels, B. & Verhoef, E. T. (2002). Using transport pricing revenues: Efficiency and acceptability. 
MD PIT working paper 4, Free University Amsterdam. Available on: http://www.feweb.vu.nl/md-
pit. 
Verhoef, E. T., Koopmans, C. C., Bliemer, M. C. J., Bovy, P. H. L., Steg, L., & Van Wee, G. P. (2004). 
Vormgeving en effecten van prijsbeleid op de weg: Effectiviteit, efficiëntie en acceptatie vanuit een 
multidisciplinair perspectief. Collective report: Free University Amsterdam, SEO Amsterdam 
Economics, University of Groningen, Delft University of Technology. 
Verhoef, E. T. & Rietveld, P. (2001). De verdelingseffecten van kilometerheffingen. Economische 
Statistische Berichten, nr. 4308, 384. 
Verhoef, E. T. (1996). Economic efficiency and social feasibility in the regulation of road transport 






Table 4.  Assessment o f decrease of road taxes (in euros) based on fuel type and weight of the car 
Weight/ fuel  Petrol  Diesel  LPG 
Light (<1000 kg)  220  550  500 
Middle (1000-1250 kg)  350  700  700 
Heavy (>1250 kg)  550  1100  1100 
 
 
Table 5.  Assessment of decrease of taxes on purchase of cars (in euros) based on fuel type and weight 
of the car 
Weight/fuel  Petrol  Diesel  LPG 
Light (<1000 kg)  300  600  300 
Middle (1000-1250 kg)  500  700  500 
Heavy (>1250 kg)  650  900  650 
 